Brazil Final Paper

For the final paper incorporating the research previously posted on this blog, please see here.

Growth Acceleration Program Phase 2 Budget

For more information on the budget and infrastructure project see: http://www.gwu.edu/~clai/working_papers/Moraes_Thais_11-10.pdf

Phase Two for Growth Acceleration Program

BETTER CITY
Objective – Tackle the major challenges facing large urban areas to improve quality of life
Areas of Focus – Sanitation, crime prevention in high-risk areas, urban mobility, paving
Estimated investment (2011-2014) – US$ 31.3 billion (R$ 57.1 billion)

CITIZEN COMMUNITY
Objective – Increase the availability of State services in poorer districts
Areas of Focus – Emergency care units, basic health clinics, daycare and pre-school centers, school sports facilities, community police stations
Estimated investment (2011-2014) – US$ 12.6 billion (R$ 23 billion)

MY HOUSE, MY LIFE
Objective – Reduce the housing deficit, stimulate the civil construction sector, and generate jobs and income
Areas of Focus – “My House, My Life” program, SBPE financing (Brazilian savings and loans system), urbanization of informal settlements
Estimated investment (2011-2014) – US$ 152.5 billion (R$ 278.2 billion)

WATER AND LIGHT FOR ALL
Objective – Provide general access to water and electricity
Areas of Focus – “Light for All” program, water supply in urban areas, water resources
Estimated investment (2011-2014) – US$ 16.6 billion (R$ 30.6 billion)

TRANSPORTATION
Objective – Consolidate, expand and integrate logistics network to ensure quality and safety
Areas of Focus – Highways, railways, ports, waterways, airports, local roads
Estimated investment (2011-2014) – US$ 57.3 billion (R$ 104.5 billion)
Estimated investment (post-2014) – US$ 2.47 billion (R$ 4.5 billio

To read the full publication: http://blogs.worldbank.org/growth/node/8715

Lula’s Growth Acceleration Program.

The large-scale infrastructure program undertaken under the presidency of Lula de Silva show great strides towards to improve Brazil.

The PAC in Practice
The Growth Acceleration Program (PAC) is an innovative approach to improving the lives of the most disadvantaged- those living in favelas. Rather than using the improvement of the favelas’ environment as one aspect of a larger social program, the usually modest infrastructural projects involved in rebuilding the slum communities are intended to be the catalysts for social change. They aim to reverse the social patterns of exclusion that hinder already poor favelados (those who live in favelas) from getting jobs, receiving mail, applying for credit or using commercial delivery services. In Rio de Janeiro, the work of the PAC in favelas such as Rocinha and Complexo do Alemão, occupies a high-profile spot in the Brazilian media. Favelados are employed as workers on the projects that improve their own living spaces, and thus the projects aim to temporarily address unemployment along with the instability of favela construction.

In August 2007, Lula announced an initial investment of US$4.2 billion in the PAC and an array of infrastructural projects to be budgeted in such areas as sanitation, water, sewage, and electricity, as well as road and housing construction, in order to improve the conditions of some of Brazil’s largest favelas. On May 7, 2008, Casa Civil minister Dilma Rousseff, a leading advisor to Lula and potential presidential candidate, announced that US$1.3 billion of the budget allotted for the PAC this year had already been spent. This level of government funding for projects that respond to the problems of the favelas is unprecedented. These numbers alone, however, do not speak to the quality of project implementation, which could be of equal if not greater importance. Thus, aggressive oversight must be maintained. With that in mind, it would be wise for more attention to be paid to the social aspect of the PAC and its projects and whether its social justice aims are successfully being attained.

 

To read the full article see: http://www.coha.org/lula’s-brazilian-growth-acceleration-program-the-best-that-government-funding-can-buy/

The Case of Belo Horizonte

Belo Horizonte is the largest city in Minas Gerais with a population of  5.4 million. Belo Horizonte has been the setting for social policy changes, such as the regularization of its favela community instead of expulsion. This article discusses the land regularization of favelas in Belo Horizonte and the ‘broad repercussions’ that take place. Since the 1980s Belo Horizonte has hosted the PRO-FAVELA-Program Municipal de Regularizacao de Favelas. The legislation associated with the PRO-FAVELA- program is a progressive step towards recognizing the property rights of favela dwellers. According to SMP in 1993 there was an estimated 600,000 people living in Belo Horizontes Favelas. The pro favela policies show a distinct change in the way favelas have been viewed and are the result of favela group movements. After the 1988 constitution was implemented there was more legislation about the expropriation of land, and adverse possession. The Pro-Favela laws specifically in Bel Horizonte recognized the creation of a special sector (SE-4), and then was eventually included in municipal zoning. The Pro-Favela legislation recognized rights to land tenure along with accentuating the constitutional decision of recognizing property as a social function.

For more information see: http://sls.sagepub.com/content/2/2/211.short?rss=1&ssource=mfc

Constructing the ‘Right to the City’ in Brazil

The article “Constructing the ‘Right to the City’ in Brazil focuses upon the need for public inclusion and development of infrastructure within Brazil. The article has great statistics outlining the way in which people live and the lack of infrastructure in numbers.

Latin America is the most urbanized region of developing world, with over 75 per cent of the population living in urban areas; in Brazil, 83 percent of the total population live in cities.

More  information about Brazil within the article that I found very interesting:

• 26 million people living in urban areas do not have access to water; 14 million are not served by garbage collections
• 83 million are not connected to sewage systems
• 70% of the collected sewage is not treated
• 52 million Brazilians walk to work
• national housing deficit is estimated at 7.9 million units

The statistics in the article were taken from http://www.ibge.gov.br/english/

To read more of the article see http://sls.sagepub.com/content/16/2/201.abstract

 

 

What do the Data Say?

The Favela-Bairro program was a municipality project undertaken by Rio de Janeiro.The project expressed direct interest in urbanizing the favela population and integration them into the formal city. The project took place in the 1990s and was implemented in two stages. The first stage took place in 1994, and the second stage took place in 2000. 38 favelas were the targets of this project. Rios attempts to address their population living in informal settlements has been matched with a large increase of favela dwellers. From 7% in 1950 to 20% by the year 2000. Medium sized communities ( 500 to 2,500 households) within the 38 selected favelas received an estimated expenditure of 3,500 dollars per family. The intervened communities there was an increase in garbage and sewage services, but with the lack of data and census information on the quality of life before implementing the program it was difficult to measure the impact and benefits of the programs.

To see the full report:

Click to access apresentacao_fabio_veras.pdf

Housing Policy, Urban Poverty, and the State.

Brazil has ‘managed’ its Favela population in Rio de Janeiro from 1972 to 1976 in very similar practices that compare to today’s. Eradication and removal of the physical existence of the Favelas and its population was practiced by Rio de Janeiro. Rio is home to 11.2 million and there are over 600 different Favelas within this city and outskirts. The paper reviews the public policy practiced by the state under dictatorship from 72-76. Favelas were removed and relocated to “embryo houses’ and apartments outside the city. The idea was to eliminate and take advantage of the high price of land in the occupied areas. This program was also accompanied with access to a housing finance system. The BNH or National Housing Bank provided served as an agent of the Housing Finance System. Ultimately the program offered homes to favela dwellers charging the new urban residents rents that were originally 25% of family income then reduced to 19%. The policy did not take into account the fact that removal of the favelados to the periphery  wouldn’t allow for the people to meet the economic burden. Being removed meant being removed from familiar sources of work and odd jobs. The program ended with massive default on an average of 74%. The favelas were removed (from the south zone where land prices were high) and the population was met with yet again economic difficulty with no real address of the core issue of poverty, access to wealth.

 

To read the full article visit: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2502876